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LATINO PROTESTANTS AND THEIR 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ENGAGEMENT 
HOW ARE LATINO PROTESTANTS ENGAGED IN LOCAL 
COMMUNITIES AND THE BROADER SOCIETY? 
On a rainy early spring morning in a modest brick Presbyterian church 
just outside the Fruitvale neighborhood of Oakland, California, sixty-
four worshippers gather. The entire worship is in Spanish. During the 
sermon, the pastor makes a passing reference to how few of the attend-
ers now live in Oakland proper, that many have to drive farther than 
ever for church services. The implicit message: the leadership of the 
church realizes that gentrification of San Francisco has spilled over the 
Bay Bridge and now threatens the availability of affordable housing 
throughout Oakland. In response, the congregation has started pro-
grams that offer legal advice for responding to rent-hiking landlords and 
identifying housing options around the city. Though resources and at-
tenders tend to be somewhat scarce, the leadership has creatively orga-
nized in an effort to address the structural and policy concerns of hous-
ing. Beyond that, the pastor proudly notes that this church readily offers 
immigration status services, computer classes, and English classes. 
Later that day, down the road forty-five miles in San Jose (still in the 
rain), over five hundred people gather in line outside the local Victory 
Outreach church for the second night of the theatrical production 
"Duke of Earl: Legacy." When the doors finally open, over one thou-
sand attenders will overflow the sanctuary to the point that the foyer 
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will be filled with folding chairs for viewing the drama on two flat-
screen closed-circuit televisions. After warm-up acts that include a 
praise team, two separate Christian rap performances, and a free "Duke 
of Earl: Legacy" T -shilt being thrown to the loudest section of the 
audience by the head pastor, the drama begins. Impressive production 
values include fog, intricate lighting, stage prop cigarettes, a full band 
for musical performances, and copious gun battles with blanks that 
leave eardrums ringing. The entire event is in English. The plot of the 
play earnestly encourages the audience to leave behind drugs, gangs, 
and violence and to commit their lives to Christ and join a church. The 
evening ends with a well-received altar call that overwhelms the stage. 
Both of the aforementioned churches reside in the San Francisco 
Bay Area. However, due to a host of reasons (including denominational 
background, neighborhood context, leadership, and resources), they en-
gage their respective communities very differently. They have variegat-
ed blinders and telescopes-social issues on which they focus intensely, 
and those that they ignore or fail to notice. Moreover, while one congre-
gation has an eA'Plicitly singular agenda, the other remains more multi-
faceted. In multiple ways, tl1en, these two congregations serve as a 
microcosm of the diversity with which Latino Protestants across the 
United States engage socially and politically. 
POPULATION GROWTH AND GEOGRAPHIC DISPERSAL 
Increasing Presence of Latinos 
Latino Protestants continue to be a religious minority within an ethnic/ 
racial minorityl in the United States. However, both of these groups 
demonstrate robust growth in terms of percentage and raw population 
numbers. Moreover, as Latinos continue to expand in terms of num-
bers, they have also dispersed throughout the United States-aniving 
in rural, suburban, and urban places that heretofore had little to no 
Latino population. With that in mind, we know that Latino Protestants 
will likely have a bourgeoning influence on public life in new ways and 
new places in the United States. In this chapter we consider Latino 
Protestant attitudes and behaviors related to social and political issues . 
Consistent with the diversity seen in previous chapters, we see hetero-
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geneity in how Latino Protestants and their churches approach social 
and political engagement. Moreover, any monolithic arguments about 
Latino religiosity and public policy preferences will be found wanting 
by the preponderance of social science evidence. 
It remains difficult to overstate the critical role that Latinos have 
played in the shifting sands of the U.S. ethnic and geographic landscape 
in the last forty years. Owing to immigration and high fertility rates, the 
Latino population has surged to the point that they have surpassed 
African Americans as the largest minority in the nation. This population 
growth has been described as a "demographic revolution." 2 Studies in-
dicate that nearly one million U.S.-born Latinos reach voting age every 
year. 3 Beyond that political power, they also have economic clout: U.S. 
Latinos have a purchasing power equivalent to the world's sixteenth-
largest country. 4 The 2010 U.S. Census rep01ted that 50.5 million peo-
ple (16 percent of a total of 308.7 million) claimed Latino or Hispanic 
ancestry. Moreover, Latino population increases accounted for more 
than half of the overall growth in the total population in the United 
States from 2000 to 2010.5 
In addition to population growth among Latinos, we have also seen 
population dispersal. These demographic shifts translate into new con-
texts for Latinos that likely demand adaptation of some sort- both on 
the part of the receiving communities and the freshly arriving Latinos 
themselves. The Census Bureau reports that the South and the Mid-
west experienced the most significant growth in Latino population be-
tween 2000 and 2010. Scholars have described these demographic 
movements as "unprecedented geographic scattering ... where [Lati-
nos] often revived dwindling nonmetropolitan communities" and 
"transformed" U.S. urban landscapes. 6 In short, while Latinos continue 
to cluster in traditional nodes in the Southwest and Northeast, they are 
also dispersing to unprecedented locales like the rural South and Mid-
west.7 
With shifting demographics, we see that Latino residential patterns 
and geographic diffusion has not followed the pattern of African 
Americans. That is, the story of Latinos in the United States in no way 
serves as a replication of the African American narrative. In the early 
years of the twenty-first century, "Latino's geographic scattering is na-
tional in scope and involves a broad range of places, from global cities to 
rural boomtowns. Furthermore, it simultaneously involves concentra-
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tion and re-segregation as well as dispersal and, presumably, social inte-
gration."8 In contrast, the Latino population in the United States re-
mains fluid and in flux. Part of the shift has included the Latinization of 
the U.S. South. Some have argued that Latinos settling in the South 
frequently receive the label of "undeserving outsiders" because of skin 
color and perceptions about citizenship. 9 Of course, the cold shoulder 
of the South has not been the uniform welcome for all Latinos in all 
comers of the country-as some communities recognize newly arriving 
Latinos as social and economic stimulators. These varying attitudes and 
contexts also play a role in how Latino Protestants position themselves 
within their local neighborhoods and the wider community. 
Latinos and Residential Segregation 
Even outside the South, Idelissa Malave and Esti Giordani claim that 
the average Latino in the United States still "lives in a segregated, lower 
income neighborhood."l0 Moreover, while there has been a shift to 
more rural regions, 91 percent of Latinos continue to live in metropoli-
tan areas. 11 That is , they tend to be in urban or suburban locales. How-
ever, they also note, "On average, between 1990 and 2009, affluent 
Latinos were more likely to live in neighborhoods with fewer resources 
than poor whites." 12 That dissonance between relative wealth and a lack 
of neighborhood resources festers because, similar to African 
Americans, Latinos in the United States have suffered from residential 
segregation: "The average or 'typical' Latino lives in a neighborhood 
that is 45 percent Latino, even though Latinos represent just 17 percent 
of the total population." 13 Of course, these patterns do not occur by 
chance: Latinos have experienced residential restrictions from real es-
tate practices that include redlining, steering, and predatory lending. 
Beyond residential segregation, Latinos in the United States also suffer 
from lower earnings (even when held constant for similar types of 
work): 'With a median annual household income at $39,000, Latinos 
earn $11,000 less than the median for the total U.S . population and 
have the lowest weekly earnings out of any other group."l4 The discrep-
ancies grow starker when considering wealth: the median wealth of 
whites in the United States soars to almost twelve times the median 
wealth of Latinos.1s 
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Marta Tienda and Norma Fuentes acknowledge that the diffusion of 
Latino populations has not always translated into socioeconomic mobil-
ity, saying, "Latinos residential dispersion evolved against a background 
of rising income inequality, industrial restructuring, population aging, 
increasing unauthorized immigration, and political polarization also has 
implications for their integration prospects" in the United States. 16 Be-
yond just exclusion, we would also note that Latino Protestants have 
been subject to what scholars have labeled a "double marginalization" 
that has consequences for their social and political beliefs and behav-
iors. In other words, Latino Protestants' racial minority status within a 
majority Anglo nation combines with a religious minority status as Prot-
estants among a majority Catholic religious affiliation among their co-
ethnics to situate them outside of the mainstream in two areas. As they 
wrestle with a doubly marginalized identity, Latino Protestants, in par-
ticular, demonstrate a fluidity in how they engage with larger commu-
nities both socially and politically.n 
In the end, Latino populations in the United States are both growing 
and dispersing. Moreover, we see that in some instances Latinos have 
also been marginalized in major U.S. cities, including Los Angeles and 
New York, to the point that some scholars have described their residen-
tial situation as one of "hypersegregation." 18 Within this context, Latino 
Protestants must consider how they will engage their neighborhoods, 
communities, cities, and broader society. 
CHURCHES BUILDING SKILLS AND PROVIDING SUPPORT 
In the face of exclusion and disc1imination, Latino Protestant congrega-
tions necessarily become both refuges and sites of public action and 
advocacy. That is, because religion remains so uniquely salient for Lati-
no Protestants, it follows that their social and political engagement will, 
in most cases, bear residue and evidence of their faith. Moreover, those 
commitments will likely occur within the context of congregational life. 
With that in mind, it only follows that Latino Protestant churches serve 
as pivotal sites for social engagement. 
Perhaps the most geographically focused and exhaustive study of 
Latino religious life occurred on the shores of Lake Michigan: The 
aforementioned Chicago Latino Congregations Study (CLCS). The au-
106 CHAPTER 6 
thors describe CLCS as "a multi-level, comprehensive study of Latino 
churches in the Chicago area." 19 Though they suffer from double mar-
ginality (or possibly because of it), Latino Protestants, according to the 
authors of the CLCS, tend to be more politically active than their Cath-
olic counterparts. The authors argue that, because of a more hierarchi-
cal church polity, Catholics learn comparatively fewer civic skills in 
their parishes. 
A number of other scholars have also argued that Latino Protestants 
have more opportunities than their Catholic counterparts to enhance 
civic skills that translate into a form of social capital. 20 Proponents of 
this argument claim, again, that the hierarchical nature of Catholicism 
limits the ability of attenders to organize and practice relevant political 
tactics. Paul Djupe and Jacob Neiheisel find, indeed, that Latino Prot-
estants receive more opportunities than Latino Catholics to "develop 
leadership skills and be recruited into politics through the church."21 
They argue that there exists more synthesis between congregation and 
community in Latino Protestant contexts: "In the broader, more Protes-
tant society, the congregation is an independent community through 
which members make ties and acquire skills. In Latino communities, on 
the other hand, the congregation is better integrated into the commu-
nity. Hence, attachment to a church in a Latino community helps the 
member to tap into community networks ." 22 Thus, the synergy of 
church and community leads to a localized form of social capital. 
Building on that notion of social capital, sociologist Norman Ruano 
finds that because of a lack of financial resources and hist01ies of volun-
tarism, Latino Protestant congregations function as sites of civic and 
administrative skill development. The CLCS rep01ted that well over 
half of all Latino Protestants indicated that they serve in some type of 
leadership role within their congregation. Latino Pentecostals led the 
way at 63 percent, followed closely, though, by Latino evangelicals and 
mainline at 59 and 58 percent, respectively. 23 Beyond that, it should 
also be noted that these Latino churches offer a locus for women to 
exercise leadership. In all of the Latino Protestant faith traditions a 
higher percentage of women than men rep01ted holding positions of 
leadership. Of course, some of the gender-related leadership discrepan-
cy relates to the fact that more women than men fill the pews of these 
congregations. Still, it seems quite clear that "Latino women ... have 
power and influence at the church."24 
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In the end, Latino Protestant congregations, to varying degrees, 
have a tendency to nurture social capital for groups that have been 
historically marginalized. Beyond that, they provide both material and 
social services. As Elizabeth Dias (Time magazine journalist) notes, 
many Latino Protestant churches become "de facto healing centers for a 
population with limited health care benefits. They act as food banks for 
people with empty refrigerators. They house people avoiding street 
violence. There's a lot more going on there than just saving·souls." 25 
Latino Protestant churches, then, frequently serve as focal points of 
community engagement and social service delivery. 
LATINO PROTESTANTS AND THEIR POLITICS 
Political Party Affiliation 
Overall, Latinos in the United States have shaded toward support of 
Democratic candidates. 26 The 2016 U.S . presidential election demon-
strated that tendency in stark relief. In the months leading up to the 
election, 54 percent of registered Latino voters indicated that the Dem-
ocratic Party demonstrated more concern than the Republican Party 
while only 11 percent said that the Republicans exhibited more-a 43 
percent gap. 27 In the aftermath of the election, exit polls revealed that 
66 percent of Latinos voted for Hillary Clinton-an overwhelming ma-
jority but a slip from the 71 percent received by Barack Obama in 2012. 
Moreover, despite his provocative comments regarding immigration 
and Mexicans, Donald Trump managed to gamer 28 percent of the 
Latino vote-a decided minority, but one percentage point higher than 
Republican candidate Mitt Romney's 27 percent from 2012. 28 Latinos 
supported Trump in greater numbers than expected despite his strong 
anti-immigration news and comments about Mexicans as dangerous and 
undesirable. Also, although some pundits had described the Latino vote 
as the "sleeping giant" that could sway the election, Latinos failed to 
surge to the polls-even with the threat of mass deportation of undocu-
mented Latinos and the stakes for the negative perception of legal 
residents where high. 
Even the 2016 presidential primary elections revealed the complex-
ities of Latino voting patterns. Two of the Republican candidates (Sena-
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tor Ted Cruz of Texas and Senator Marco Rubio of Florida) highlighted 
their Latino roots and pollsters watched to see if either could rally a 
critical mass of Latino support. However, both senators' stances on 
policy issues like immigration caused many Latinos to withhold their 
backing. More than that, interviews with Mexican Americans who 
found little solidarity with Cruz and Rubio's Cuban background under-
mined any notion of a Latino voting bloc for a Latino candidate. 29 
Some scholars have noted, though, that Republican politicians in the 
United States have made particular efforts to embrace evangelical Lati-
nos on the basis of shared conservative social values related to issues 
like abortion. 30 However, these invitations for alliance have found limit-
ed acceptance. In fact, in a May 2015 editorial in the Wall Street Jour-
nal, Russell Moore, president of the Ethics and Religious Liberty Com-
mission of the Southern Baptist Convention (the largest Protestant de-
nomination in the United States) , warned Republican presidential can-
didates to be wary of offending both white and Latino evangelicals . He 
noted the growing political clout of evangelical Latinos and that all 
candidates would do well to respect them: "The most evangelistic, 
growing congregations in this country are filled with first- and second-
generation immigrants. There is more salsa at our church potlucks late-
ly, and we like it .... An immigrant brother in the next pew is a person, 
a creation of God, not a pinata for politicians. 'Born again' comes in 
Spanish as well as English versions-and so do voters." Moore noted 
that in the weeks before he wrote, Latino evangelicals by the thousands 
had gathered in Houston to discuss issues that included abortion, racial 
justice, and economic opportunity. His message was clear: Politicians 
who ignored evangelical Latinos did so at their own petil. 31 
Other studies have also confirmed the tendency of non-Catholic 
Latinos to be more likely to support Republican Party candidates than 
Catholic Latinos. 32 For Latino Protestants, frequent church attendance 
seems to have a relationship with social conservatism on some-but not 
all-issues. For instance, political scientist Ali Adam Valenzuela found 
that regular churchgoers were "significantly and substantively more 
likely than infrequent attenders to identify as Republican" and to op-
pose gay marriage and abmtion. 33 However, when consideting views 
regarding irnmigrant amnesty and economic welfare, Valenzuela found 
no differences between regular and infrequent churchgoers among Lat-
ino Protestants. 
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Committed, churchgoing Latino Protestants remain a tantalizing 
demographic for Republicans in the United States because when com-
pared to Latino Catholics and the nonaffiliated they consistently report 
more conservative political preferences. Moreover, Valenzuela finds 
that Latino Protestants who consistently attend church demonstrate 
substantially more conservative philosophies than their less-
committed fellow parishioners. 34 In fact, researchers at the Pew Re-
search Center noted that in the 2012 U.S . presidential election, among 
the Latino electorate, religious identities played a crucial role in how 
individuals voted. While 80 percent of religiously unaffiliated Latinos 
and 75 percent of Latino Catholics claimed support for Barack Obama, 
only 50 percent of evangelical Latinos said the same. Similarly, on the 
eve of the 2016 election, the Pew Research Center reported a wide 
discrepancy in how Latinos planned to vote: While 59 percent of Latino 
Catholics indicated their support for Clinton, only 12 percent of Latino 
evangelicals said the same. 35 Perhaps not surprisingly, among Latinos in 
the United States, religious affiliation seems to have a degree of influ-
ence on voting patterns. 36 
Political Attitudes and Stances 
More recently, in 2014, Pew found that, in general, Latinos in the 
United States tend to lean toward Democratic Party affiliations. Over 
half (56 percent) of Latinos indicated that they identified as Democrats 
while only one in five (21 percent) leaned toward the Republican Par-
ty. 37 Even when examining through the prism of religion, the Demo-
cratic tendencies remain: Latino evangelicals ( 48 percent), mainline 
Protestants (54 percent), and Catholics (58 percent) all lean more 
Democrat than Republican (evangelicals: 30 percent, mainline Protes-
tants: 23 percent, and Catholics: 21 percent). 38 U.S. Latinos demon-
strate a sharp break with their co-religionists on political party affilia-
tion. A 2012 Pew study reported that 70 percent of white evangelicals 
leaned Republican- more than twice the percentage of Latino evangel-
icals . In a similar fashion, white mainline Protestants also leaned more 
Republican at a percentage (51 percent) more than twice that of main-
line Protestant Latinos. 39 
From their exhaustive rep01t related to Latino demographics, Ide-
lisse Malave and Esti Giordani also note that "Overall, religious affilia-
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tion does not have the same impact on party affiliation among Latinos 
as it does among white voters." 40 By way of example, they point to the 
stark contrast in preference for the Democratic Party between white 
and Latino evangelicals: while roughly half of Latino evangelicals affili-
ate with the Democratic Party, a scant 23 percent of white evangelicals 
do the same. Correspondingly, "almost three-quarters of white evangel-
icals (72 percent) identifY or lean toward the Republican Party, while 
only 36 percent of Latino evangelicals do." 41 
Similar to Aflican Americans, Latino Protestants with strong relig-
ious commitment appear to be "less motivated by the faith-based politi-
cal conservatism observed in white Christian circles." 42 There also 
seems to be a common tendency for Af1ican American and Latino min-
isters to similarly focus more heavily on social justice issues than white 
religious assemblies. White congregations, as members of the dominant 
racial demographic in the United States, likely have less appetite for 
issues related to marginalized minority groups. 43 
The CLCS found that when examining contemporary issues that 
ranged from U.S. intervention in Iraq to the U.S. embargo against 
Cuba, mainline Protestant Latinos tended to express opposition to U.S. 
foreign policy almost as much as Latino Catholics, while a distinct mi-
nority of both Pentecostals and evangelicals expressed negative views 
regarding such foreign policy issues. It follows, then, that the same 
study revealed that more evangelical (53 percent) and Pentecostal (53 
percent) leaders viewed themselves as politically conservative, while 
very few mainline (18 percent) labeled themselves the same way. Be-
yond political viewpoints, we also find differences among Latino Protes-
tants in terms of political activities and engagement in Chicago. Inter-
estingly, a full 93 percent of evangelicals claimed to never participate in 
political activities. Roughly 83 percent of mainline Latinos made the 
same claim. It should also be noted that the lack of citizenship status 
should be remembered as a variable that might inhibit some from par-
ticipating in overt political action. 44 
While mainline Protestant Latinos show a slightly higher preference 
than their evangelical counterparts for the Democratic Party, no such 
discrepancy appears when considering the role and size of government. 
When que1ied about whether they would prefer a smaller government 
with fewer services or a larger government with more services, 62 per-
cent of both evangelical and mainline Protestant Latinos indicated a 
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preference for the latter. In short, both groups favor more government 
services. However, neither Protestant group favored larger government 
as much as Latino Catholics (72 percent). In addition, it should be 
noted that a similar percentage of the minority among Latino evangeli-
cals and mainline Protestants indicated preference for smaller govern-
ment (25 percent of evangelicals and 29 percent of mainline Protes-
tants). In this regard, Latino Protestants are markedly divergent from 
the general public of the United States, where the majority (51 percent) 
prefers a smaller government and the minority ( 40 percent) prefers a 
larger government. 45 
In terms of attitudes toward international intervention by the United 
States, political scientist James L. Guth divides Latino Protestants into 
two categories: Traditionalists and Modernists. 46 He describes Tradi-
tionalists as those who would be included in fundamentalist, evangeli-
cal, charismatic, or Pentecostal camps. Modernists, then, include most 
of the mainline and any who identify themselves as liberal. Guth reports 
that more than six in ten (62 .1 percent) Traditionalist Latino Protes-
tants qualify as "Hardliners" (strong supporters of preemptive U.S. mili-
tary intervention and "hawkish" foreign policy47 ) compared to less than 
three in ten (28.9 percent) Modernist Latino Protestants and about one 
in ten ( 10.4 percent) Latino Catholics. 48 Thus we also see that religious 
tradition predisposes Latino Protestant attitudes regarding internation-
al affairs. 
Similarly, in their case study of Chicago, the CLCS noted that when 
examining political attitudes and behavior through the filter of religious 
tradition, a pattern emerges where Latino Catholics and mainline Prot-
estants have more liberal inclinations than Latino evangelicals and Pen-
tecostals. For instance, respondents within their study from "Catholic 
and mainline churches were more likely to vote for Democratic presi-
dential candidates than respondents in evangelical and Pentecostal 
churches, and were more likely to disagree with the U.S. intervention in 
Iraq." The study's authors went on to "note that the divide is not be-
tween Catholics and Protestants more broadly, highlighting the impor-
tance of distinguishing between mainline Protestant and conservative 
Protestant groups."49 Indeed, the heterogeneity of Latino Protestant 
sociopolitical beliefs manifest in myriad attitudes and behaviors. 
Even in an issue like immigration, where uniformity of Latino opin-
ions might be assumed, we see complexity. Not surprisingly, the major-
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ity of overall Latinos (53 percent) tend to identifY immigration as a 
pressing issue for the United States. Somewhat counterintuitively, 
though, a comparable percentage of Latinos rank quality of public 
schools (55 percent) , the federal deficit (54 percent), and the cost of 
college (53 percent) as critical issues for the country as well. 5° Corrobo-
rating these findings , the Pew Research Center also rep01ts that while 
73 percent of Latinos indicate that immigration reform is extremely 
important or very important to them, more say that issues of education 
(92 percent), jobs and the economy (91 percent) , and health care (86 
percent) are extremely or very important to them. 5l In short, Latinos in 
the United States do not monolithically focus on immigration as the 
political issue of significance. Moreover, Latino attitudes regarding the 
importance of immigration also diverge by religious tradition. The ma-
jority of both Catholic (59 percent) and mainline Protestant (57 per-
cent) Latinos express the opinion that they understood immigration as a 
"critical" issue. Fewer evangelical ( 48 percent) Latinos see immigration 
as important. 52 
On the related issue of "path to citizenship," again, the majority ( 67 
percent) of Latinos supp01t the U.S. government "[allowing immi-
grants] a way to become citizens provided they meet certain require-
ments." Filtering by religious tradition, though, again also reveals a 
slight heterogeneity ofopinions. While strong majorities of every Latino 
religious group support a path to citizenship for immigrants currently 
living in the country without documentation, Catholics (72 percent) and 
evangelicals (75 percent) report nearly identical rates and mainline 
Protestant Latinos dip to nearly two-thirds (67 percent) . Interestingly 
enough, the religiously unaffiliated report the least amount of support 
(59 percent). 53 While half of Latino Catholics ( 49 percent) report hear-
ing clergy speak about immigration, only about a third of Latino Protes-
tants indicate the same (35 percent evangelicals and 37 percent of 
mainline Protestants). Moreover, when compared to Latino Catholics 
(26 percent), a very small percentage of Latino mainline Protestants (16 
percent) and Latino evangelicals (12 percent) report their churches 
participating in immigration rights protests or boycotts. 54 Thus we con-
tinue to see that the contours of religion affect even issues that might be 
assumed to have consensus among Latinos. 
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PUBLIC ROLES OF LATINO PROTESTANT 
RELIGIOUS LEADERS 
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On an issue-by-issue basis, we see a complex picture of Latino religious 
leaders' political leanings. When asked directly about how they de-
scribed themselves, about half of both evangelical (53 percent) and 
Pentecostal (also 53 percent) Latino leaders described themselves as 
conservative. In comparison, both mainline (18 percent) and Catholic 
(20 percent) leaders indicated significantly less inclination to do the 
same. However, these percentages should not be misinterpreted as 
meaning that substantial swaths of Latino Catholic and mainline Protes-
tant leaders understood their political identity as liberal. Most, in fact, 
saw themselves as moderate (70 percent of Catholics and 64 percent of 
mainline). Among Chicago Latino religious leaders, very few defined 
their political leaning as liberal. Mainline and Catholics leaders had the 
highest percentages (19 percent and 10 percent, respectively). Interest-
ingly, while 7 percent of Pentecostal leaders identified as liberal, no 
Latino evangelical leaders in Chicago indicated such a political identity. 
Thus, we see an admittedly narrow band of liberal political leanings 
within Latino Pentecostalism that does not manifest in that way within 
Latino evangelicalism. This unique conservatism among Latino evan-
gelical leaders also bore itself out when the prompt asked about politi-
cal party affiliation. Among all Chicago-area Latino religious leaders, 
only evangelicals identified with the Republican Party (33 percent) 
more than Democratic Party (24 percent). For Pentecostal leaders, the 
numbers were almost inverted: 32 percent Democrat and 22 percent 
Republican. Democrats saw even more support among Catholics and 
mainline Protestants. About half of both groups of Latino religious lead-
ers identified as Democrats, and a very scant minmity (2 percent of 
Catholics and 5 percent of mainline) labeled themselves as Republi-
cans. 55 
Regardless of their religious leaders' political affiliations, the major-
ity Latino Protestants want to hear political views from the pulpit. Lati-
no evangelicals (65 percent) , especially indicated appreciation for hear-
ing clergy discuss political and social issues. Demonstrating the range of 
opinions within Latino Protestantism, a significantly lower percentage 
of Latino mainline Protestants (52 percent) agreed with that senti-
ment.56 
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Political Activities of Latino Protestant Attenders 
Compared to Latino Catholics, Latino Protestants demonstrate as high 
(or higher) levels of political action.57 However, a close look at the 
Latino churches within the Chicago study still reveals fairly low levels of 
political engagement. For instance, the CLCS also found that evangeli-
cal Latino attenders claimed very little political activity. When queried 
with whether they participated in a voter registration drive, volunteered 
for a political campaign, or donated money to a party, over nine in ten 
(93 percent) evangelical Latinos reported that they never participated 
in any of the mentioned activities-the highest of any of the religious 
traditions. Some of that seeming political apathy likely found resonance 
with issues of citizenship status among these evangelicals: U.S. citizens 
tended (16 percent) to be more likely to say that they had been involved 
in political action than noncitizens (9 percent). Overall, the vast major-
ity of Latinos in the study, regardless of religious tradition, indicated 
high levels of political inactivity. Beyond evangelicals, the other three 
religious traditions all had rates of at least eight in ten congregants 
reporting having never participated in political activities . 58 Of course, it 
should be noted that the apparent lack of political activity might simply 
be a function of the survey question. When the same respondents re-
ported whether they had contacted a religious official within the last 
year, the percentages of those reporting "never" dropped. Latino evan-
gelicals still emerged as the most reticent with more than eight in ten 
(82 percent) indicating that they had never spoken with or contacted a 
public official within the last twelve months. Latino Pentecostals, main-
line Protestants, and Catholics, though, should not be classified as acti-
vists: a high percentage of attenders from three religious traditions re-
ported never contacting or speaking with a public official in the last year 
(Pentecostal: 76 percent, mainline: 70 percent, and Catholic: 67 per-
cent) . 59 
Limited congregational engagement, though, should not be inter-
preted as evidence of political withdrawal being preached from Latino 
pulpits. Instead, we see that almost half of the Latino religious leaders 
from Chicago had requested their members to call or write a public 
official. Beyond that, half of the religious leaders reported asking that 
their congregation sign a petition. Catholic (60 percent) and mainline 
(58 percent) leaders had a more pronounced tendency to ask that their 
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congregants sign petitions than their counterparts in Pentecostal ( 40 
percent) and evangelical ( 42 percent) traditions. 60 
Overall, we also see that Latino mainline Protestants and Latino 
Catholics tend to have similar views regarding the intersection of relig-
ious beliefs and politics. A little over one-third of each (38 percent of 
mainline Protestants and 36 percent of Catholics) agreed that religious 
beliefs played a "very important" role influencing their political think-
ing. In marked contrast, 62 percent of Latino evangelicals offered the 
same assessment of religion and politics. 6l Thus we see within Latino 
Protestantism a wide discrepancy in understanding how religion should 
interact with political issues. 
LATINO PROTESTANTS AND SEXUAL AND 
FAMILY ISSUES 
Attitudes Regarding Same Sex Marriage 
Moving from politics to social issues, we also find multiple viewpoints 
among Latino Protestants. Overall, in terms of same-sex marriage atti-
tudes, studies find that Latinos who have at least some ties to faith 
communities have demonstrated a resistance to progressive policies 
that allow for the establishment of same-sex marriage. 62 That is, Latinos 
of any religious background tend to articulate resistance to same-sex 
marriage. The assumption, though, that the cultural conservatism that 
exists among Latinos in the United States serves as evidence of cultural 
Roman Catholic residue has been proven erroneous . Instead, we see-
similar to the general population- conservative Protestant Latino lead-
ers and denominations have been at the forefront of those promoting 
traditional marriage while opposing any movement toward the legaliza-
tion of same-sex marriage. 
A 2012 study by Pew found that 66 percent of Latino evangelicals 
described themselves as strongly opposed to same-sex marriage. Simi-
larly, a 2013 study by the Public Religion Research Institute reported 
that 8 in lO (79 percent) Latino evangelicals opposed same-sex mar-
riage. In short, Latino evangelicals, in pmticular, tend to be fairly uni-
form on the issue of same-sex marriage. 63 In the mid-2000s, for in-
stance, the National Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference 
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(NHCLC), a consortium of Latino evangelical leaders, led an effort to 
mobilize against same-sex maniage. NHCLC materials couched their 
argument in a way that framed opposition as motivated by desire for the 
flourishing of the broader evangelical community. Their resistance, 
they claimed, was not about being "anti-gay or discriminating against 
anyone." 64 Rather, they argued that, along with faith in God, they sim-
ply saw families with both "a mother and a father" as "the primary 
deterrent in the Latino community to drug abuse, gang violence, teen-
age pregnancy, and other social ills." With that sentiment in mind, it 
should be noted that the NHCLC has sought to distance itself from 
"the media-exacerbated image of angry white evangelicals who oppose 
everything."65 Thus in this narrative offered by the NHCLC, resistance 
to same-sex marriage should be understood as for the benefit of Latino 
communities, not as intolerance. Though the NHCLC lays claim to 
being largest Latino evangelical organization in the United States, they 
clearly do not represent all Latino Protestants. In fact, Christopher 
Ellison and colleagues noted that in 2008 Reverend Ignacio Castuera, a 
Methodist, argued in a televised debate that LGBT persons should have 
the right to marry: "The Bible has many different models of sexuality 
and many different models of family .... We cannot impose the Bible as 
the right belief onto a population with people who are multicultural and 
religiously diverse."66 
Regina Branton and her colleagues found that Latino Catholics have 
a significantly higher probability of suppmting civil unions for same-sex 
couples, when compared to Latino Protestants. 67 Christopher Ellison 
and his colleagues, though, note that evangelical Latinos, in particular, 
tend to be much more resistant to same-sex marriage than Latino Cath-
olics. In fact, evangelical Latinos who attended church regularly had an 
84 percent chance of being less likely to approve same-sex maniage 
than their Catholic counterparts. However, we begin to see disparity 
among Latino Protestants and their views regarding same-sex marriage 
when we widen the scope and consider mainline Protestant Latinos. It 
seems that within that subset, church attendance has salience: Ellison 
and his colleagues find that among mainline Latinos, regular attenders 
disapprove of same-sex marriage more than Catholics, while non-week-
ly attenders from the same religious tradition tend to be more suppor-
tive of same-sex marriage. 68 In sum, then, Latino Protestants have rep-
resentatives on both poles of the same-sex marriage spectrum, while 
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Latino Catholics seem to embrace more relatively moderate views. Ev-
angelicals and regular attenders among mainline Protestants tend to 
oppose same-sex marriage, while sporadic attenders among mainline 
Latinos tend to support same-sex marriage. 69 
In Chicago, when asked about same-sex marriage, Latino evangeli-
cals and Pentecostals modify to the more traditional positions: nine in 
ten (92 percent) evangelicals and almost all (99 percent) of Pentecostals 
either "disagreed" or "strongly disagreed" with same-sex marriage. In 
contrast, only about half of mainline ( 45 percent) and Catholic ( 62 
percent) leaders expressed the same reservations regarding same-sex 
marriage. 70 
Indeed, a 2012 Pew study found that among Latino Protestants 
while 46 percent of those who attended mainline churches favored 
same-sex marriage, only 25 percent of evangelicals felt the same way. 
Moreover, neither group of Latino Protestants registered as much sup-
port for same-sex marriage as Catholics (54 percent). 71 Beyond that, 
even among evangelical Latinos, views regarding same-sex marriage 
remain diverse: 71 percent of those who attend church at least weekly 
oppose same-sex marriage, while those who attend less often expressed 
less resistance (58 percent). 72 
Attitudes Regarding Divorce, Cohabitation, and Casual Sex 
As already noted, for Latino Protestants, church attendance has sali-
ence for other social issues as well. In assessing Latino Protestant views 
regarding marriage, divorce, cohabitation, and casual sex, Ellison, Wol-
finger, and Ramos-Wada found that those who attended church more 
regularly also tended to report more traditional views. Beyond that, 
evangelical Latinos also reported more traditional views than their 
Catholic counterpmts. Again, Ellison and his colleagues note that such 
a finding undermines the long-held assumption that Latino cultural 
conservatism results as a simple by-product of Catholicism. In fact, in 
only one of the four issues under discussion, sanctity of maniage, do 
Latino Catholics and evangelicals maintain the same level of conserva-
tism. In terms of opposition to divorce, cohabitation, and casual sex, 
evangelical Latinos "are substantially more conservative than Catho-
lics ."73 Ellison and his colleagues claim that these views can be directly 
traced to the evangelical tendency to believe "that the Bible is the Word 
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of God and that it is without error and contains necessary and sufficient 
information to guide most human affairs , especially those involving faith 
and family." 74 That is , a strict interpretation of biblical injunctions leads 
to social traditionalism among Latino evangelicals. 
Attitudes Regarding Abortion 
Religious tradition matters significantly when exploring how Latinos in 
the United States feel about the issue of abortion. Likely due to their 
overall higher levels of religiosity, Latinos generally express more oppo-
sition to abortion than Anglos. However, when we analyze differences 
among religious traditions, we see tl1at evangelical Latinos are especial-
ly hostile to abortion- more so than their Catholic counterparts. Regina 
Branton and her colleagues report that Latino Catholics have a higher 
probability of also supporting legal abmtion in all circumstances than 
Latino Protestants. 75 On this score, Latino Catholics represent the mid-
dle ground: About half indicate that abortion should be illegal in all or 
most circumstances. Among Latino Protestants, though, there exists a 
wide range of opinion. While seven in ten (70 percent) evangelical 
Latinos say abortion should be mostly or entirely illegal, only 46 percent 
of mainline Protestants agree with that sentiment. 76 
In interpreting their opposition to abortion, John Bartkowski and his 
colleagues argue that these conservative Protestant Latinos have trans-
posed religious schemas from broader evangelicalism in the United 
States. 77 That is, while both white and Latino Catholics seem more 
prone to selectively embracing Vatican judgments regarding social is-
sues like abmtion, both white and Latino evangelicals demonstrate 
strong opposition to abortion. Beyond that, it may be the case that 
Latino evangelicals embrace the antiabmtion positioning of white evan-
gelicals in order to negotiate their double marginality: "Strong opposi-
tion to abortion situates evangelical Latinos squarely within the broader 
universe of conservative Protestantism. At the same time, these convic-
tions distinguish them from the 'lukewarm' commitment to Christian 
principles exhibited by their Catholic peers ."7R Of course, such a stance 
by Latino evangelicals should not simply be interpreted as cynical polit-
ical maneuvering. However, it should be noted that such attitudes re-
garding abmtion might have the latent function of creating alliances 
with white evangelicals. 
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Attitudes Regarding Gender Roles 
Compared to the overall U.S. population, Latinos in the United States 
resist embracing traditional gender roles related to marriage and the 
family. In fact, the vast majority (79 percent) express a preference for 
having both wife and husband working and sharing child care and house 
management as opposed to a more traditional arrangement where the 
husband functions as sole provider (supported by only 18 percent). In 
that way, Latinos articulate a predilection for traditional gender and 
family life at a rate less than the general population of the United States 
(given that 62 percent indicated support for traditional family struc-
tures). 79 
Among Latinos, though, a discrepancy in attitudes regarding family 
and marriage patterns emerges when examined through the filter of 
religion. Whereas 26 percent of Latino Protestants expressed support 
for more traditional roles, only 15 percent of Latino Catholics agreed. 
Among Latino Protestants, evangelicals emerged as more traditional in 
this regard than mainline Protestants (29 percent versus 19 percent). In 
teasing out this idea further, Pew asked "whether a husband should 
have the final say in family matters."SO Overall, about six in ten (63 
percent) of Latinos rejected the statement. A religious breakdown, 
however, proved insightful. Unaffiliated Latinos led the way in dis-
agreeing with the statement at a rate of 7 4 percent, followed by Catho-
lics at 67 percent. Among Protestant Latinos, 55 percent of those in the 
mainline rejected while only 43 percent of evangelicals did the same. In 
other words, evangelicals were the only religious tradition among Lati-
nos in the United States to have a majority (53 percent) completely or 
mostly agree with the statement, "a husband should have the final say in 
family matters."Bl The theme of gender dynamics within Latino com-
munities also emerged in other studies. Instead of examining gender 
roles in marriage, a 2009 Pew study queried about gender based relig-
ious roles within families . When asked whether "men have a duty to 
serve as religious leaders in the marriage and family," the majority of 
Protestant Latinos (70 percent) agreed with that sentiment while Cath-
olic Latinos remained split (50 percent). However, evangelical Latinos 
expressed a higher level of enthusiasm (75 percent supported) than did 
mainline Latinos (55 percent). 82 
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VIEWS ON ECONOMICS AND POVERTY 
Beyond family and gender issues, studies on Latino Protestants yield 
interesting insights on their views regarding economic issues. Based on 
their more conservative leanings demonstrated thus far, perhaps it 
should not be surprising to learn that Latino Protestants, when com-
pared to their Catholic counterparts, are less likely to indicate that the 
poor face hardship because of a dearth of government interventions. 
Although there is danger in oversimplifYing the nuances of how individ-
uals think about the sources of poverty, it remains instructive to note 
that the dialogue traditionally has two dominant camps: (1) those who 
argue that pove1ty results largely from structural causes and (2) those 
who claim that the attitudes, behaviors, skills, and talents of individuals 
delineate who will be poor in the opportunity-filled United States. 83 
With that dichotomy in mind, studies indicate that devout (frequent 
attenders of worship services) evangelical Latinos are 55 percent less 
likely than devout Latino Catholics to mticulate a sense that the poor 
face difficulty because of a lack of government recourses. In other 
words, evangelical Latinos express less sympathy toward the poor than 
Catholic Latinos. 
These divergent attitudes toward the poor are consistent with trends 
seen among other racial demographics in the United States and the 
manner in which religious identity influences attitudes toward the poor. 
It seems that the idiosyncratic nature of Catholic and Protestant ethics 
remain robust in spite of a racial or ethnic distinction: the "Catholic 
ethic emphasizing sharing and material generosity" and the "conserva-
tive Protestant ethic being much more individualistic and moralistic 
with regard to material wealth."84 
The fact that evangelical Latinos look similar to white evangelicals 
when explaining the sources of poverty, though, fails to translate into a 
wholesale endorsement of identical social and political attitudes within 
the religious tradition. For instance, Latino evangelicals and white ev-
angelicals look very different when pulling the ballot box lever. The 
Pew Research Center found that white evangelicals supported Mitt 
Romney's 2012 presidential bid at a rate of almost three out of four (74 
percent) while only four out of ten (39 percent) of evangelical Latinos 
did the same. 85 
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Of course, in the United States economic issues tend to be entwined 
with issues of race. In their landmark tome about race and religion in 
the United States, Divided by Faith: Evangelical Religion and the Prob-
lem of Race in America, sociologists Michael Emerson and Christian 
Smith noted that many white evangelicals embraced a "miracle motif' 
regarding racial reconciliation in the United States. That is, white evan-
gelicals tended to assume that as more and more individuals converted 
to the Christian faith, racial alienation would decrease. In a seeming 
test of the miracle motif regarding all social ills, Pew asked Latinos if 
they agreed with the statement, "If enough people were brought to 
Christ, social ills would take care of themselves."86 Perhaps not surpris-
ingly-since Emerson and Smith identified the miracle motif as a 
uniquely evangelical manifestation-we see a discrepancy in whether 
Protestant Latinos would endorse such a statement. While about two-
thirds ( 65 percent) of evangelical Latinos agreed with the statement, 
only about half (51 percent) of mainline Protestants concurred. 87 Thus 
we see that the evangelical "cultural tool kit" identified by Emerson and 
Smith transcends some racial boundaries . 
PROVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES BY LATINO 
PROTESTANT CONGREGATIONS 
Amount and Types of Social Service Delivery 
Social engagement, of course, means more than social positions and 
politics. Congregations of all religious orientations and racial back-
grounds have entered into social service delivery, and Latino Protes-
tants are no different in that regard. In fact, Gaston Espinosa has 
argued that "Latino Protestant churches are more likely to provide so-
cial services than their Catholic counterparts" in many measures of 
social action. 88 Individually, about one-third (32 percent) of Latino 
Protestants volunteer with a neighborhood organization, a business, or a 
youth agency. Evangelical Latinos (34 percent) do so just slightly more 
than mainline Protestant Latinos (29 percent). For both sets of Protes-
tants, though, the amount of volunteering declines when the engage-
ment changes focus to tutoring or school programs (23 percent for 
evangelicals and 25 percent for mainline Protestants). 89 
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Of course, churches engage in social service delivery in multiple 
ways . A Hudson Institute national survey of 452 Latino Protestant con-
gregations found that 72 percent offered social service programs. 90 Be-
yond that, the CLCS found that every one of the Latino religious lead-
ers they interviewed indicated that their congregations provided some 
sort of health care-related service delivery to their respective commu-
nities in Chicago. However, Latino Protestants tend to offer interven-
tions like health services less frequently than their Catholic counter-
parts- an interesting phenomenon because a higher percentage of Lat-
ino Catholics (61 percent) agree that guaranteeing health care for all 
citizen's should be the government's responsibility compared to Latino 
mainline Protestants (53 percent) and evangelicals (50 percent). 91 
While Catholic churches average over five different types of health 
service, Latino mainline Protestants (3.38), evangelicals (3.56), and 
Pentecostals (2.61) all offer less . The authors attlibute the stark contrast 
between Catholics and Pentecostals especially as explained by the fact 
that Catholic churches tend to be much larger than their Pentecostal 
counterparts and, thus, have more resources and capacities for health-
related services. 92 
The percentage of health services programming among Latino Prot-
estant churches also varies among the mainline, evangelicals, and Pen-
tecostals depending on the health service being delivered. The report 
considers five areas of health services: Alcoholics Anonymous, sex edu-
cation, diabetes screening, nuhition information, and blood pressure 
screenings. Except for the area of sex education, a higher percentage of 
Catholic congregations offered health services when compared to the 
Latino Protestant congregations in the study. Beyond Catholic-Protes-
tant distinctions, however, it should be noted that discrepancies exist 
among evangelical, mainline, and Pentecostal congregations as well. 
For instance, evangelicals (35 percent) are more likely to offer sex edu-
cation than mainline (24 percent) or Pentecostal (27 percent) congrega-
tions. Evangelical congregations also lead the way (31 percent) on offer-
ing nutrition information (mainline: 19 percent and Pentecostal: 13 per-
cent). On the other hand, mainline churches offer more (33 percent) 
opportunities for blood pressure screenings than those of the evangeli-
cal (31 percent) or Pentecostal (24 percent) traditions. 
Of course, in all these instance of health services rendered by Latino 
Protestant congregations it should be noted that the vast maj01ity of 
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these programs are largely informal structures that lack robust organiza-
tion. 93 At the same, though, it could be argued that these congregations 
possess invaluable knowledge of networks and neighborhoods that 
might allow for more incisive health care delivery that targets the needs 
of the population. In the end, the strand of religious tradition within 
Protestantism has significant influence on how these Latinos engage the 
larger community in terms of health services programming. 
Latino Pentecostalism and Community Engagement 
With all this evidence, it does seem clear that different strains of Latino 
Protestantism have different concerns, p1iorities, and behaviors when it 
comes to social and civic engagement. How do we account for this 
heterogeneity? Some have argued that Pentecostalism, especially, 
stands out among other faith traditions within Latino Protestantism. 
Gaston Espinosa, in his comprehensive tome, Latino Pentecostals in 
America: Faith and Politics in Action, claims that Latino Pentecostals, 
in particular, avoid the traditional evangelical and mainline tendency to 
decouple evangelism and social justice. 94 In other words, Latino Pente-
costals meld an evangelistic social work that assumes an outreach that 
demonstrates "the love and saving grace of Jesus Christ to a broken and 
suffering world."95 It seems that Latino Pentecostals reject notions of 
the Social Gospel and Liberation Theology as they see both movements 
as "not Christ-centered enough." 96 Indeed, among some Latino Protes-
tant congregations there seems to be a strong sense that social engage-
ment is not necessarily a political act. In our ethnographic research of a 
Latino Protestant church in the Bay Area of California, we heard at-
tenders/leaders tell us, "Feeding the poor is not a political act." In other 
words, that particular congregation simply understood social engage-
ment as the church being the church-they did not see it as a political 
statement. 
Ruano argues that a significant number of Latino Pentecostal con-
gregations find themselves located in neighborhoods plagued by pover-
ty and other attendant social problems. Because of that context, it be-
comes "imperative to understand the types of civic skills and civic en-
gagement opportunities afforded to the congregants and whether they 
translate into engagement outside of the church, and if so, under what 
circumstances."97 While Pentecostalism has long been assumed to be a 
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faith that fosters closed, inward-facing communities, congregations like 
Pastor Rene Molina's Restauracion Los Angeles hear messages that 
encourage attenders to become active in political and social issues. Mo-
lina states that anyone who has citizenship has a responsibility to vote, 
and if they cannot do that, they should be in marches that seek to 
change restrictive immigration laws. Molina does not counsel his con-
gregation to tum inward- in fact, he actively engages the broader com-
munity of Los Angeles by organizing with local African American pas-
tors on issues of racial reconciliation. 98 
While those congregations organize around racial reconciliation, 
other congregations coalesce around other issues. For example, Victory 
Outreach (highlighted earlier in the chapter), a coalition of six hundred 
churches worldwide, finds focus in building "a tightly knit community 
among recovering gang members ."99 Sociologist Edward Flores de-
scribes Vict01y Outreach as an "evangelical-Pentecostal" network that 
emphasizes a hard rupture with old communities and intensive involve-
ment with the church- including evenings, weekends, and holidays-as 
a method of "un-becoming a homie and joining the non-gang soci-
ety."100 Other scholars have described Victory Outreach as an "emotion-
al rescue ministry." 101 Church leaders encourage members to forgo 
relationships, hobbies, and jobs that might interfere with paliicipation 
in congregational worship and events. Moreover, Victory Church mim-
ics the Pentecostal church's decentralized hierarchies and rigid relig-
ious boundaries to promote what Flores describes as a "segregated re-
demption" for former gang members.102 Though Victory Outreach 
churches might stand as an outlier with their singular and aggressive 
focus on gang rehabilitation, it does represent the energy that Latino 
Pentecostal congregations have developed for celiain issues. 
In the end, numerous studies have indicated that most congrega-
tions tend to provide some type of social service program- if not multi-
ple programs. Latino Protestant churches are no different. However, it 
is also clear that among Latino Protestants the rationales for and modes 
of community engagement differ markedly based on religious tradition 
and context. 
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LATINO PROTESTANTS AND LOCAL PARACHURCH 
COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS 
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Of course, not all of Latino Protestant social and political life occurs 
under the auspices of church. Instead, we see that they have crafted 
other institutions and organizations "whose very purpose is to provide 
some type of social service for the community they serve." 103 These 
faith-based organizations (FBOs) maintain religious foundations , but 
because of Internal Revenue Service regulations, they are required to 
eschew proselytizing while providing a social service. Catherine Wilson 
closely examined two of the largest Latino Protestant FBOs. The first , 
the Latino Pastoral Action Center (LPAC), is located in the South 
Bronx in New York and is led by a Pentecostal minister, Reverend 
Raymond Rivera. The second, Nueva Esperanza, is located in North 
Philadelphia and is led by an evangelical pastor, Reverend Luis Cmtes 
Jr. Consideration of these FBOs proves instructive because they allude 
to the scope and diversity of Latino Protestant social and political en-
gagement-they help to extrapolate the values, culture, and beliefs of 
these faith communities. As Wilson contends, "along with congrega-
tions, FBOs help the Latino community to mediate its religious sen-
sibilities and, in doing so, prepare this community for social and politi-
cal involvement." 104 In other words, along with congregations, FBOs 
have become integral organizing institutions for focusing Latino Protes-
tant social engagement in the United States. 
Wilson, in her study of Latino FBOs, claims that these organizations 
tend to emphasize "the incarnation of Jesus Christ, the kingdom of God 
on ea1th, and personal salvation at the end of one's earthly journey." 105 
Despite the doctrinal differences that have divided the Latino commu-
nities over the years, Wilson argues that especially in cities, "social, 
political, and economic injustices" have caused various strands of Prot-
estants and Catholics to ally. Wilson goes on to note that Justo 
Gonzalez, a United Methodist and prolific theological author, has 
argued that the best path forward for urban Latinos in the United 
States includes Protestants and Catholics aligning to "[walk] the same 
th "106 pa . 
The aforementioned LPAC includes a local network of over three 
hundred clergy and a mailing list that boasts over two thousand clergy 
addresses . The FBO focuses on intentionally grooming indigenous 
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leaders.Wilson claims that the theological underpinnings of LP AC can 
be found in "the Pentecostal worldview."l07 That is , the flexibility and 
spontaneity associated with Pentecostalism leads directly to the infor-
mal and adaptive responses of LP AC to the old and new social issues of 
the South Bronx. While Pentecostalism has often been described as 
"otherworldly," LPAC directly addresses current socioeconomic issues. 
Wilson notes that Rivera, the founder and director, has stated that his 
job is not confined to saving sinners but also "to do something about the 
problems in the neighborhood." 108 LPAC's programming includes job 
readiness workshops, gang prevention, English-as-a-second-language 
classes, alternative late-night entertainment for youth, recreational op-
portunities, and collaborating with local agencies on the issues of at-risk 
youth. LPAC's collaborators in these initiatives have ranged from the 
New York City Department of Probation to Quaker Friends to Bud-
dhist temples. In other words, LPAC has demonstrated a robust em-
phasis on community partnership formation that undermines assump-
tions about a more insular Pentecostal community. These pmtnerships, 
though, all have to align with LPAC's focus on the "whole person" and 
to help them transform their lives. In the end, Wilson desc1ibes LPAC 
as a "ministry of personal outreach." 109 
In somewhat of a contrast, Wilson portrays Nueva Esperanza as a 
ministry of institutional development. In fact, Nueva's mission rests on 
a "commitment to the creation of Hispanic-owned and operating insti-
tutions that serve the economic and spiritual well-being of the commu-
nity."110 Yet both FBOs find similmity in a deeply rooted belief in the 
transfonnative power of the Ch1istian message. Nueva has grown from 
a $60,000 one-year grant in 1987 to cohosting President George W. 
Bush at tl1e first National Hispanic Prayer Breakfast in 2002. Indeed, 
there remains little doubt that Nueva stands as a high-profile example 
of Latino Protestant social and political engagement. As further evi-
dence, Wilson also notes that a Janumy 2005 issue of Time magazine 
declared Cortes held a position among the "25 Most Influential Evan-
gelicals" in the United States. 
At least a portion of their fledgling influence should be traced to the 
FBOs' strategic political maneuve1ing. Indeed, Nueva has been decid-
edly nonpartisan in its governmental alliances. Cortes has described his 
political affiliations: "''m not red, and I'm not blue. I'm brown."lll In 
essence, Cortes, in making such a proclamation declares himself a sup-
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porter of those who would advance the cause of Latinos in the United 
States. To that end, Nueva has hosted high-profile politicians ranging 
from Hillary Clinton to John McCain. Nueva refuses to limit itself with 
any type of partisan affiliations.n2 
The organization ultimately wants to spend political and social capi-
tal in ways that holistically benefit Latino communities and individuals. 
Nueva understands that "the Latino community struggles simultaneous-
ly with both material and spiritual needs." 113 With that in mind, the 
institutional development catalyzed by the FBO assumes that material 
conditions of extreme want must be addressed before there can be a 
resolution of spiritual issues.ll4 Wilson contends that since it views its 
ministry as a business, "Nueva is a model of faith-based entrepreneur-
ship." us 
To that end, Nueva engages in educational, health, and social issues. 
Tangible examples of these effmts include Laundromats, housing units 
(including one project that consisted of fourteen units and cost $1.6 
million that reflected a Spanish Revival-style architecture desired by 
the inhabitants), and the establishment of the Career Link Center (for 
job training and work readiness).l16 In all these multifaceted efforts, 
Nueva sees itself as a ministry primarily of institutional development. 
At a national level, Nueva has been a vocal advocate for comprehen-
sive immigration reform. Cortes himself, in fact, testified in July of 2006 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee against a bill that included un-
compromising language regarding any individual who "assists, encour-
ages, or induces a[n] [undocumented] person to reside in or remain in 
the United States." 117 Wilson notes that Cortes asserted that "such a 
provision amounted to the criminalization of all Hispanic clergy and 
non-Hispanic clergy aiding the undocumented."HS In multiple ways, 
then, Nueva exceeds what some might assume an evangelical FBO 
would focus on. 
Nueva and LPAC offer a glimpse of the breadth and range of Latino 
Protestant social engagement. Though outsiders might discern negli-
gible differences in the theological foundations of the two FBOs, they 
actually manifest in starkly different orientations to community social 
service provision. While LP AC operates, as we might expect, from an 
evangelical orientation- a focus on the individual and relationships-
we see that Nueva operates somewhat counterintuitively: still an evan-
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gelical organization, but with a strong emphasis on institutions and 
structures. 
NATIONAL PROFILE LATINO PROTESTANT 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Local FBOs, though, are not the only forms of parachurch organiza-
tions that Latino Protestants have formed. The nonpattisan posture 
assumed by Nueva has also been adopted by the aforementioned Na-
tional Hispanic Christian Leadership Conference (NHCLC) and the 
National Latino Evangelical Coalition (NaLEC). As evidence, the 
NHCLC makes frequent use of a metaphor that they follow not the 
"donkey" (the Democratic Party) or the "elephant" (the Republican 
Party), but the lamb (a symbol of Jesus Christ). Led by the charismatic 
Reverend Samuel Rodriguez, the NHCLC claims to be "America's larg-
est Hispanic Christian Evangelical organization, representing more 
than 100 million evangelical Latinos who worship in more than 40,000 
congregations throughout the United States." 119 In addition, the 
NHCLC reports that it represents seventy-five denominations and 
faith-based organizations.I20 The organization's website declares the in-
tention "to reconcile Evangelist Billy Graham's message of salvation 
through Christ with Dr. Martin Luther King's march of prophetic acti-
vism."l21 In other words, NHCLC positions itself as similar to tradition-
al evangelicalism in the United States- but with a social edge that 
pushes harder for issues of reconciliation. Indeed, language from the 
organization's promotional documents demonstrates a desire to exceed 
the traditional evangelical emphasis on gaining conversions to Chris-
tianity. The vision statement asserts that NHCLC seeks to "engage and 
reform the culture by engaging, empowe1ing and equipping Hispanic 
Christ following born again men and women to emerge as key influenc-
ers in all spheres of society and the marketplace." And in the event that 
outsiders disregard the organization as another predictably conservative 
organization, the NHCLC distances itself by noting their efforts to "en-
rich the narrative of American Evangelicalism by replacing the media 
exacerbated image of angry white evangelicals who oppose everything 
to a convicted yet compassionate multi-ethnic kingdom culture commu-
nity committed to sharing truth with love." Yet NHCLC remains a 
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decidedly evangelical organization when they refer to their emphases 
on rejecting "moral relativism," "spiritual apathy," and "cultural deca-
dence" while "elevating biblical marriage" and striving to "champion 
life." 122 Such terms likely function as codes that nod to the more typical 
white evangelical social concerns. 
As a burgeoning player in national politics, news organizations will 
frequently seek NHCLC's opinion on issues and politicians as represen-
tative of evangelical Latinos. In fact, during the prologue to the 2016 
U.S. presidential election, Rodriguez served as a prominent voice, rep-
resenting evangelical Latinos and how they might respond to the candi-
dates. A Reuters article quoted Rodriguez discussing Ted Cruz's seem-
ing lack of appeal for Latino voters: "At times, Senator Cruz finds it 
difficult to identify or engage with his Latino heritage." 123 The article 
also described NHCLC as a "key conservative group" in the United 
States. As further evidence of the political clout of the NHCLC, it 
should be noted that President Barack Obama's administration "regu-
larly contacted" its leaders "about their Latino, Evangelical, and faith-
friendly policies." 124 Moreover, as the Obama administration regularly 
sought the counsel of Rodriguez, they have broadened the scope of the 
relationship to the point that they have also discussed religious liberty, 
marriage, immigration, and health care.l25 
Though not as large as the NHCLC, the NaLEC, led by Gabriel 
Salguero, has also attained a rather high profile as well. The NaLEC has 
similarly positioned itself as a "nonpartisan voice" for evangelical Lati-
nos and Latinas "committed to the common good and justice in the 
public sphere." In fact, when Tony Campolo and Shane Claiborne (two 
progressive white evangelical leaders ) offered their assessment of the 
2016 presidential election in the pages of the New York Times, they 
insisted that the future of evangelical Christianity no longer resided 
with whites. Instead, they identified Salguero and the NaLEC by name 
and asserted that such leaders and organizations represented the future 
of evangelicalism in the United States.l26 Salguero has also served in an 
advisory role to President Obama and is regularly sought by journalists 
for quotes on policy issues. The NaLEC displayed some of the breadth 
of their policy concerns in early 2015 when Salguero announced the 
coalition's plan to organize around issues of childhood poverty, to sup-
pmt body cameras as "a necessity" for all police, and to announce their 
opposition to the death penalty. 127 In the end, both the N aLEC and the 
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NHCLC stand as only two examples of the nascent civic and social 
engagement of Latino Protestants. 
A STORY OF IMMIGRATION IN A LATINO 
PROTESTANT CHURCH 
At a Latino Protestant church in Texas, we heard a testimonial from a 
prominent lay pastor, Antonio-a sixty-two-year-old of Salvadoran de-
scent. He related how he had been riding in a car with a friend driving 
when police stopped the vehicle for tailgating. During the procedure, 
the officer eventually asked for documentation. Neither man having 
any, the officer arrested both Antonio and his friend and they would be 
transferred and detained at a large immigration center in Pearson, Tex-
as, for a month. As Antonio related his story to the rest of the congrega-
tion, he described his stay at the detention center as "marvelous." 
Through the filter of his religious tool kit, Antonio reframed an experi-
ence that sounded less than marvelous as miraculous and abounding 
with signs of God's provision. 
Antonio explained in detail being forced to take off all his clothes 
and remain undressed except for his undergarments for at least an hour 
in a cold cell. He recalled being able to hear men crying out loud in 
cells next to him. Once he received his uniform, he described to the 
congregation that his minimalist meals included one packet of crackers 
and a small juice-once a day. Ultimately, Antonio tells the congrega-
tion not to feel sorry for him: through his suffe1ing he garnered the 
strength to comfort others and preach the gospel to them. More than 
that, Antonio expresses his gratitude that the church held enchilada 
sales to hire lawyers who crafted the pape1work that allowed him to be 
released. At multiple points, Antonio mentions that his lawyers indicat-
ed that his past c1iminal history made it likely that he would be de-
ported. However, because of the character references and testimonials 
of the church leadership and pastors, Antonio received an atypical re-
lease. With a dramatic conclusion, Antonio announced that God had 
the last word on his detainment and decided to release him. Claps and 
shouts of "Hallelujah" and "Amen" fill the sanctuary as Antonio returns 
to his seat. 
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The church provided Antonio a platform to share his story and a 
receptive audience by which he could humanize his experience as an 
unauthorized migrant. Additionally, the religious framing allowed him 
to highlight the conditions of others at this center in a public way. While 
Antonio likely would not describe it as political, the message indeed 
carried policy implications. Indeed, in his role as a pastor of the church, 
he remained in communication with the families of other detainees. 
Moreover, he continues to do religiously motivated activist work with 
the detention center. 
Antonio's case demonstrates how some Latino Protestant congrega-
tions function as sites of civic activism. Many of these churches do not 
have the luxury of choosing their "mission" or how they might consider 
socially engaging their community. Instead, as larger social issues like 
immigration embroil congregational attenders, the church has no 
choice but to become to some degree social activists. In these moments, 
though, church leaders and attenders use their faith to frame the situa-
tion and offer hope for future resolution. 
In other instances, Latino Protestant churches have started to offer 
proactive programs related to immigration. A congregation our research 
team observed in Fresno, California, has initiated a number of pro-
grams to allow members to remain in the United States. The church 
understands serving the spiritual and economic needs of undocu-
mented Latino immigrants as one of its primary ministries. On a per-
sonal level, the pastor writes letters of recommendation to be used for 
"deferred action programs" or to apply for local jobs. Collectively, the 
congregation raises money for farm laborers and undocumented fami-
lies who struggle financially. In implementing these eff01ts, the church 
intentionally stays within the framework of U.S. laws. When our re-
search team asked the pastor what boundaries he might push, for in-
stance, to reunite a family, he resolutely responded, "I don't work 
against the laws of the U.S. This is my country, and I respect the law." 
We found in this and other congregations that though the church empa-
thized with undocumented Latinos, they established limits to interven-
tion. 
In effect, for undocumented church members who experience the 
daily threat of deportation in Fresno, the leaders of the church affirm 
the law by telling members to "stay put" and not attempt to reenter the 
country illegally. In addition, the church encourages undocumented 
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members to obtain Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers (ITIN) 
from the Internal Revenue Service so that they may declare their tax 
liability. The leadership describes the practice as a method for estab-
lishing a "good record" that will be rewarded when immigration policy 
reform eventually grants them legal status or citizenship. 
THE MANY CONCERNS OF LATINO PROTESTANT 
CONGREGATIONS 
The many attitudes, behaviors, and organizations of Latino Protestants 
undermine sweeping assessments. 128 The population growth and dis-
persal of Latino Protestants has contextually influenced how they 
choose to engage. For instance, while immigration policy may be at the 
forefront for many Latino Protestants, it certainly does not stand as the 
only issue for which they demonstrate concern. Context matters. And 
even within the same region, one church may feel pressed by gang 
issues among their youth while another attempts to cope with gentrifi-
cation. Moreover, theology matters. Religious traditions within Latino 
Protestant populations have also led to various political attitudes and 
social activities. Scale matters as well: Latino Protestant engagement 
includes everything from highly localized congregations to national or-
ganizations that make news with press releases and have the ear of the 
president of the United States. In the end, the bulk of social science 
evidence clearly demonstrates a complexity in how Latino Protestants 
engage in community and public life that remains to be fully disentan-
gled. 
